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Abstract: The core research question in this article is a straightforward one: has EU regional policy, 
interpreted as a form of Europeanisation, produced policy change? What explanatory variables might 
explain such change, or resistance to change? These questions give rise to consideration of three main 
hypotheses to explain change: those of misfit, convergence and mobilisation. The three hypotheses are 
‘tested’ with reference to two cases, France and the United Kingdom. The research thus captures two 
distinct state types that represent contrasting liberal democratic poles and yet contain sufficient variation 
to allow internal, as well as cross-national comparison. The cases considered offer some evidence of 
inertia (the management of structural funds reaffirming pre-existing national patterns of centre-periphery 
relations), some evidence of policy recalibration (in the UK devolved nations and the French regions), but 
none of policy transformation as a result of EU cohesion policy. As a more general point, structural funds 
policy is perhaps not the most appropriate instrument to measure policy change; from this survey, 
structural funds are an epiphenomenon of deeper explanatory variables rooted mainly (but not exclusively) 
in domestic institutional orders and change 
 
Résumé : La question clé de cet article est simple : la politique régionale de l’UE, entendue comme une 
forme d’européanisation a-t-elle produit du changement politique ? Quelles variables explicatives 
pourraient expliquer tel changement ou résistance au changement ? Ces questions donnent lieu à 
considérer trois hypothèses principales pour expliquer le changement : celles du mésajustement, de la 
convergence et de la mobilisation. Ces trois hypothèses sont « testées » à partir de deux études de cas, la 
France et le Royaume-Uni. La recherche s’intéresse donc à deux Etats différenciés représentant deux pôles 
démocratiques et qui contiennent suffisamment de variation pour permettre une comparaison à la fois intra 
et inter-nationale. Les cas considérés présentent des éléments d’inertie (la gestion des fonds structurels 
reposant largement sur des modèles centre/périphérie préexistants), de requalibrage de l’action publique 
(dans les « nations » de la dévolution au Royaume-Uni et les régions décentralisées en France), mais en 
aucun cas d’éléments de profonde  transformation de l’action publique liés directement à l’impact de la 
politique de cohésion. Plus généralement, les fonds structurels n’est peut-être pas l’instrument le plus 
approprié pour évaluer le changement de l’action publique. Dans cette enquête, les fonds structurels sont 
un épiphénomène de variables explicatives plus profondes ancrées principalement dans les ordres 
politiques institutionnels domestiques. 
 
  
Studies of the impact of European integration on regions have typically been articulated 
in the language of multi-level governance, an approach that views the European policy 
process as ‘a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several 
territorial tiers’ (Marks, 1993: p393).  One of the strongest arguments by supporters of 
multi-level governance is that EU cohesion policy has transformed territorial policy 
styles across Europe, by encouraging and facilitating the development of new political 
strategies and networks, bypassing State administrations and creating new alliances 
between the European Commission and sub-state players (Börzel, 2002; Hooghe and 
Marks, 2001; Keating, 1998). This perspective views the multi-level game played jointly 
by the European Commission (and latterly the European Parliament) and sub-state actors 
as a normative one, designed to ‘by-pass’ or ‘evade’ the centre qua central government, 
and result in an overall strengthening of both supranational and regional tier (Carter and 
Pasquier, 2010). The multi-level governance approach can sustain a decentralisation 
narrative that emphasises the financing of regional and structural programmes, the 
institutionalisation of regional representation at EU level and the transnational activity of 
the regions. But it is also in part a model of European bureau shaping and 
institutionalisation. The story of structural funds is one of tensions between the 
distributive and regulatory dimensions of the EU. The Commission assists regions on the 
one hand (through regional policy), but seeks to avoid competition distorting incentives 
on the other (via competition policy).  The EU’s regional programme has developed its 
own complex institutions, using spillover arguments to centralise control around the 
European Commission in general (and DG Regio in particular).  
 
Others contest the decentralisation narrative. In their reading, European integration in 
general reinforces a centralized decision-making structure to which regional actors have 
limited access; and in the specific case of EU regional policy, national governments 
remain the key gatekeepers of relations between the EU and sub-state levels. Member-
states are far more important interlocutors for the Commission than sub-state actors or 
their associations. Ultimately, member-states determine the level of budget upon which 
EU Regional policy is based (Jeffery, 2000, John, 2000, Bourne, 2003 Weatherill and 
Bernitz, 2005). National administrative and institutional structures are thus barely 
affected by EU regional policy. Indeed, in some important respects,   Europeanisation 
strengthens the role of central government actors. Through integration processes, national 
governments are seen to be able to ‘take back’ hard-won regional powers and exercise 
authority over them within EU fora.   
 
The multi-level governance literature has considerable heuristical value. The approach 
has been the target of much criticism, however, being labelled by Bache, George & 
Rhodes (1996: pp 312-3) as descriptive rather than explanatory. More pertinently, in our 
view, Jeffery (2000) argues the multi-level governance is too top-down to account for 
complex interactions.  By seeking to explain regional activities as a consequence of 
interaction between the European Commission and Member States in the 1998 Structural 
Funds reforms, it implied that regional mobilisation was reactive, rather than pro-active, 
in nature.  It also confused regional activism with impact. Although regional governments 
are active in European policy formulation process, both domestically and though 
lobbying in Brussels, this does not mean that they have any influence over Member State 
negotiating positions or eventual EU policy outcomes.   
 
This apparent lack of explanatory power of MLG  has led other writers to combine multi-
level analysis with alternative frameworks such as Europeanisation.  Radaelli (2003) 
defined Europeanisation as the “processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) 
institutionalisation of norms, beliefs, formal and informal rules, procedures, policy 
paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ that are first defined and consolidated in the EU 
policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national) 
discourse, political structures, and public policies”. Thus defined, Europeanisation must 
produce policy change to be validated.  Graziano (2011) proposes three broad hypotheses 
to attempt to build a typology of how and why Europeanisation produces policy change; 
policy transformation involves a change in objectives, principles, procedures and 
financial instruments; policy recalibration requires two of the above, while policy inertia 
signifies no variation.    
 The core research question in this article a straightforward one: has EU regional policy, 
interpreted as a form of Europeanisation, produced policy change? If so, how much? And 
what explanatory variables might explain such change, or resistance to change? The latter 
sub-question gives rise to consideration of three  main hypotheses to explain change: 
those of misfit, convergence and mobilisation. Misfit refers to the degree of difference 
between EU policy and traditional national (sub-national) positions.  Misfit applies most 
obviously to ‘weaker’ states. Even in the cases of the UK and France, however, the 
objects of this article, the Europeanisation of regional policy runs against powerful pre-
existing traditions, whether in the form of national territorial planning (the French case) 
or pressures for national regional policies (and repatriation of control over EU structural 
funds) in the UK. Misfit is fundamentally an institutional argument, based  on the 
persistence of national administrative and institutional structures, or their reshaping under 
the impact of EU level institutions ( Jupille and Caparoso, 1999). Regional policy has 
developed in an incremental manner to become a very significant policy instrument at the 
EU level.  Each reform has reallocated powers and provided the theatre for an 
indeterminate struggle for influence between the EU and the member-states. The EU 
Commission has used structural policy to shape its preferences and has forced reluctant 
member-states to adapt, even powerful states such as Germany. 
 
Convergence predicts a process of convergence between states, as outliers are under 
pressure to conform to norms of best practice, overwhelming economic pressures or 
constraining instruments. The pressures promoting a harder form of convergence between 
EU states are usually presented as economic, in the form of globalisation, European 
integration (framed as a form of globalisation) and fiscal policy; or epistemic, via the 
trans-national diffusion of scientific and economic expertise and technical norms.  In the 
Europeanisation literature, the policy dissonance hypothesis (whereby a state is ‘out of 
step’ with the EU level) assumes that EU level pressures for change will eventually 
produce conformity at the national policy level.  For Europeanisation to be watertight, it 
would need to demonstrate policy change, either by converging outputs (beyond the 
scope of this article) or, in a more limited sense, by common organisational trends (for 
example towards generalised forms of new public management).   
 
Mobilisation points to the role of political actors, such as parties and pressure groups, in 
driving pressures for change (or in blocking change). In Graziano’s third hypothesis, 
change will only occur if the ‘national mediating factors’, such as sub-national networks, 
parties, pressure groups, are mobilised to transform pressures for change into substantive 
change.  
 
The three hypotheses are ‘tested’ with reference to two cases, those of France and the 
United Kingdom.  In their different ways, France and UK are two strong and influential 
states within the broader EU.  They are both old states with distinctive state traditions.  
The research thus captures two distinct state types that represent contrasting liberal 
democratic poles and yet contain sufficient variation to allow internal, as well as cross-
national comparison (Lagroye and Wright 1979; Ashford 1982, Cole and John, 2001, 
Cole, 2006). The French model is sometimes represented in terms of a holistic concept of 
the state as a reified legal and moral entity. There is a territorial version of this state-
centric model, in the form of ‘cross- regulation’, a form of cartel arrangement between 
the state and dominant local interests (Duran and Thoenig, 1996).  In the case of the 
United Kingdom, the dual polity model, theorized with talent by Bulpitt (1983), implied a 
large degree of discretion for local government in areas of ‘low politics’, such as service 
delivery, which lay outside of the immediate interests of the centre. These traditional 
understandings of territorial relations have been challenged by the consequences of three 
decades of decentralization in France and by the far-reaching neo-liberal and 
constitutional reforms of the 1979-1997 and 1997-2010 periods in the UK.  
 
Our article is best read as an empirically grounded, paired comparative contribution to 
ongoing debates about the variable impact of Europeanisation across states, levels of 
governance and policy domains. Using elements of a most different research design, it 
facilitates our understanding of when Europeanisation appears as a useful conceptual tool 
– and when other forms of explanation are more pertinent. France and the UK provide 
fertile ground for testing the claims both of multi-level governance and Europeanisation.  
 
The rival contextual narratives of decentralization and centralization presented both 
centre on common core questions. Does the management of structural funds mainly 
reaffirm national patterns of centre-periphery relations? Has European integration in 
general and EU Regional policy in particular strengthened (regional) territorial capacity?  
How does the mobilisation of formal and informal political resources contribute to the 
process of mobilizing regional capacity in the field of negotiating and implementing EU 
regional policy? Are paradiplomacy and regional offices, as one expression of regional 
ambition, simply another expression of the ‘sound and fury’ of sub-state players or do 
they represent novel forms of informal institution? We will now endeavor to answer these 
core questions.  
 
National preference formation  
 
The process of national preference formation refers to how national institutions build 
their preferences and negotiate them at the EU level. There is a fairly close link to more 
bounded and inter-governmental formulations of European integration. The evidence 
presented here is broadly consistent with the argument that the management of structural 
funds mainly reaffirms national patterns of centre-periphery relations. Even if the 
direction of change is towards enhanced EU-level steering, member-states are far more 
important interlocutors for the Commission than sub-state actors or their associations. 
Ultimately, member-states determine the level of budget upon which EU Regional policy 
is based.  
 
France and the UK were both traditionally considered as unitary states, with a high 
degree of territorial coverage and control. The ensuing analysis demonstrates a broad 
process of divergence, driven by distinctive domestic paths and opposing usages of the 
symbols and resources of the European Union.   
 
The misfit is most obvious in relation to the UK. Though the UK has been an important 
beneficiary of EU regional policy, and though the creation of ERDF itself was partly 
linked to British entry, British governments have had difficulties with its core principles. 
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the Conservative government in power in London 
contested the core elements of EU regional policy, notably the principles of additionality 
and partnership. The UK Treasury for long refused the additionality principle, where EU 
grants should add to, rather than offset existing public expenditure.  There was, in broad 
brush terms, a conflict between the United Kingdom government, which sought to use its 
own regional policy instruments (Regional Selective Assistance) with its large coverage 
under its Assisted Areas schemes; and the EU, which wanted to limit aid to pockets such 
as the Objective One areas (Wishlade, Yuill and Méndez, 2003).  
 
The UK position also challenged understandings of partnership that accompanied the 
1988 reforms. The domestic UK context of the mid-1980s was one of legislation to 
regulate and reduce the influence of trade unions and to redefine central-local relations. 
There was a close linkage between domestic-level management reforms and the domestic 
governance of EU regional policy. Formal partnerships in England were heavily weighted 
in favour of the Non-Departmental Public Bodies (‘quangos’) at the expense of local 
authorities (John, 2001).  More generally, a sceptical stance has been a constant of the 
UK’s position and not only under the Conservatives. During the negotiations for the 
2007-2013 period, for example, the UK government argued in favour of ‘re-
nationalisation’ of EU regional policy: structural funds should be limited to states with  a 
GDP of under 90% of the EU average, but member-states should be able to introduce 
their own programmes of territorial planning.   
 
The case of France also demonstrates a degree of initial tension between national 
traditions and preference formation and the developing Europeanisation of EU regional 
policy. After the devastation of the World War II, a modernizing French State embarked 
upon an ambitious programme of economic and industrial re-building. Government 
policy was expansionist, aimed at promoting growth in the provinces and correcting the 
imbalances between Paris and the rest of France. During the 1960s and 1970s, 
center-periphery relations in France were managed largely by the central agency the 
Direction à l’aménagement du territoire et à l’action régionale (DATAR) in the context 
of its evolving vision of territorial planning (aménagement du territoire). The objectives 
of territorial planning were to promote regional development by steering industrial 
investments to peripheral regions such as Brittany or Languedoc-Roussillon and 
developing their transport and physical infrastructure. During this period, the central 
administration was opposed to the building of a European regional policy, which was 
perceived as a potential competitor to the national policy of aménagement du territoire. 
 
Political dynamics have changed in both countries since the baseline 1988 Structural 
Fund reforms, but the underlying causes of change were only marginally linked to the EU 
dimension. While the UK confirms the policy inertia hypothesis, a stronger argument can 
be made for Europeanisation in the French case.  
 
In the case of the UK, political dynamics were modified by the election of the new 
Labour government in 1997, and by the changing territorial configuration, notably 
devolution in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The changing partisan context had 
an obvious impact. The new Labour government, which advocated a more positive role in 
Europe and proactive stance to local authorities, adopted a less trenchant attitude towards 
partnerships and the additionality principle.  The management of EU funds on the ground 
reflected this shift of governmental priorities at the central level.  In the case of the 
Objective One area of Merseyside, for example, the Programme Monitoring Committee 
(PMC) was henceforth chaired by a non-governmental representative and local 
authorities were brought more fully into the fold (Wilmott, 2005). In the three English 
Objective One regions, the 2000-06 rounds involved a broader network of partners and 
more  project commissioning rather than open bidding. New Labour policy priorities 
were also more in harmony with those in other EU countries, and close to the spirit of the 
- Blairite inspired – Lisbon goals of investment, IT, innovation, infrastructure and 
training.   Coming full circle, however, the UK Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition 
government (2010- )  then abolished all existing regional level institutions, including the 
Government Offices of the Regions and the Regional Development Agencies and 
returned spatial planning powers to local government (Mellows-Facer, 2010; Townsend 
and Marrs, 2010). Over the period, there is weak evidence of the linkage between EU 
regional policy and regional empowerment, except tangenitally in the case of the Celtic 
nations (Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland) that are considered below.  
 
In the case of France, the Europeanisation argument is somewhat stronger.  From the 
1980s onwards, the growing internationalization of the economy called into question the 
post- war state-led policies of territorial planning. The French state, like other European 
nation-states, has been confronted for some years by the dual pressure of European 
integration and the growing desire for autonomy on the part of sub-national political 
levels. The implementation of EU cohesion policy has to be understood in the context of 
two core variables: the decline of state-led policies of territorial planning and the 
decentralisation of the French political system.  
 
First, the decline of state-led territorial planning policies made the financial resources 
provided by EU cohesion policy all the more valuable (Drevet 2008). The French 
government lobbied hard to ensure that France received its share of structural funds.  
Being the second main funder of the EU cohesion policy after Germany, the French 
governement has traditionally been able to ensure that EU structural funds covered all the 
national territory. Even if the structural funds are being reduced - France received €14.3 
billion in the 2007-13 period  against €16.1 billion in 2000-06 - all 22 metropolitan 
regions are concerned by the ‘regional  competitiveness’ objective and the four overseas 
regions (Guadeloupe, Guyane, Martinique and Réunion
 ) by the ‘convergence objective’. 
However, this strategy of full territorial coverage is increasingly contested by the 
European Commission and other Member-states, in particular in relation to the 2007-
2013 programme. French governments have adopted seemingly rather contradictory 
positions. In December 2006, France signed a letter with Austria, the Netherlands, 
Germany, Sweden and UK supporting the limitation of the EU budget to 1% of the EU 
GDP. During the same period, however, the French central government defended the role 
of the cohesion policy against those (such as the UK government, but also some within 
the European Commission) who wanted to ‘renationalise’ regional policy, or limit 
structural funds to the new central and eastern member-states. This apparent paradox is 
testament to the effectiveness of the mobilisation of regional and local authorities, 
strongly attached to the structural funds policy.  
 
Second, successive decentralization reforms since 1982 have modified centre-periphery 
relations within France. It lies beyond the limits of this article to engage in an in-depth 
discussion of decentralization in France over the past three decades. The foundational 
reforms of 1982-83 transformed the existing 22 administrative regions into regional 
political institutions, conferring real executive powers on the presidents of the regional 
and 96 departmental councils.  The 22 metropolitan Regions obtained competencies in 
economic development, vocational training, education (secondary schools), regional 
railway transport planning, the environment, culture and research. With such 
competencies, French regions ought to be the natural partners of the European 
administration in the planning and implementation of EU cohesion policy. In comparative 
terms, however, the French State has attempted to  maintain a tight steer on regional-
European interactions, with the central planning agency, the DATAR and the regional 
prefectures  maintaining control of the key policy instruments.  
 
The relationship between Europeanisation and regional capacity building in France is 
highly ambivalent. On the one hand, the development of EU structural funds has 
provided a new structure of opportunities and new sources of finance for French local and 
regional authorities, in particular for the most ambitious of them such as Brittany (Balme 
and Le Galès 1996 Négrier, 1998). On the other hand, central and regional state actors 
have resisted relinquishing control over details of project management. Rather like in the 
UK, the principle of partnership in EU cohesion policy has produced tensions, mainly 
played out in terms of who manages the structural funds.  Since the 1990s, French 
regions have attempted to become managing authorities of the structural funds. But the 
different central governments during the 1990s and the 2000s steadfastly refused the 
demands of the regional councils, confirming the regional prefectures in the central role.  
In practice, the Regions and the regional prefectures co-chair the PMCs, but the regional 
prefectures remain officially the managing authorities. In  2006 de Villepin’s government 
confirmed the State services, rather than local authorities, as the managing authorities, 
arguing that this situation pertained in the majority of the 27 EU member States. 
 
Has EU Regional policy fundamentally reshaped domestic policy networks?  
 
The second question addresses multi-level governance, stricto sensu, rather than multi-
level government. While multi-level government focusses on relations between 
governments at different territorial layers, multi-level governance emphasises broader 
questions of state-society relations and reconfigured domestic policy networks (Piatonni, 
2010, Palmer, 2008).  For the Europeanisation hypothesis to be validated, the empirical 
data needs to demonstrate that state-society relations have been broadened by European-
level dynamics. 
 
In the case of the UK, this question can only be answered by taking full account of the 
territorial assymetry consolidated by devolution. In 2011, it has become difficult to 
generalise about the UK as a whole, rather than to identify variation across its four 
component nations. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are considered below in the 
section on territorial assymetry.  The case of England proves to be the most resistant to 
the Europeanisation argument. From the 1988 reform of the structural funds onwards, the 
Conservative UK government placed obstacles in the development of partnerships, hence 
undermined in practice the emergence of a broad stakeholder base to accompany EU 
funds. There was a close linkage between domestic-level management reforms and the 
governance of EU regional policy. One key driver of the 1979-1997 Conservative 
governments was the creation of a range of new agencies in England and Wales - City 
Challenge, the Training and Enterprise Councils, the Urban Development Corporations – 
all committed to various versions of new public management and an agency mode of 
urban governance. Formal partnerships in England were heavily weighted in favour of 
the Non-Departmental Public Bodies (‘quangos’) at the expense of local authorities, 
which were sometimes even prevented from naming their own representatives to the 
PMCs (John, 2001).  For their part, the richest and most powerful regions – such as the 
South-East or the East of England – have not invested much time and resources in EU 
structural funds (as opposed to more general place marketing).  Where closer forms of 
cooperation have developed in less affluent regions, this is only tangentially associated 
with European integration. The coincidence of pro-regional and pro-European beliefs has 
been strongest, historically, where political and economic elites were motivated to 
organise at the regional level to make most of EU incentives. This was the case for the 
North West England, with a large Objective 2 remit, and incorporating Merseyside with 
Objective One. In these regions, at least, there emerged a sharper political focus on 
Europe, though this was elite-led and remote from mass opinion.   
 
The major constitutional change represented by the Labour Government’s (1997-2010) 
Devolution programme has highlighted gaps in English arrangements.  In addition to the 
creation of devolved institutions in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the Labour 
government initially adopted a positive attitude towards the development of English 
regions.  Labour created eight Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), given the task of 
coordinating regional development strategies. The RDAs provided a central focus for 
raising the match-funding necessary to support bids, and were financed from a pooled 
Single Budget, to which the lead ministries all contributed.  In terms of their institutional 
design, the RDAs were non-departmental public bodies, or agencies  governed by 
‘partnership’ boards that mainly encompassed local government and business interests; 
they provided the linkage, through the  Government Offices of the Regions, with state 
officials.  Though RDA were tasked with producing regional strategies, the Government 
Offices (very weak equivalents to French regional prefectures) retained their key role  as 
the Managing Authorities of EU structural funds. The Government Offices were not 
always viewed with suspicion by local government or the Development Agencies; Burch 
and Gomez (2003) give the example of the North-West regional assembly and the North 
West Development Agency working in close association with the Government Office.  
From 2000-2010, the Government Offices expanded their remit to incorporate the field 
activities of more UK departments: the Home Office, DEFRA and Culture, Media and 
Sport in particular.  
 
The critical juncture in this case, as in others, was the coming to power of the Coalition 
Government in 2010, an administration with a strong ‘localist’ agenda, but a deep 
suspicion of regional levels of public administration. The Coalition government replaced 
the Regional Development Agencies with Local Entreprise Partnerships, conceived as 
new local government- business led partnerships, which will be given the main 
responsibility for administering ERDF funds. There are unresolved questions of 
institutional design with the new LEPS. The ERDF has to be administered regionally, but 
the LEPs cover much smaller areas. While the RDAs covered the whole of England, the 
LEPs are designed to be competitive, leaving some potential beneficiaries of EU regional 
funds without the necessary domestic institutional structures to facilitate match funding. 
As coverage will be far less extensive, so it will be more difficulty to drawn down EU 
grants.  Moreover, the Coalition government has hinted that the LEPs will have much less 
autonomy in managing and allocating funds than the RDAs used to. These developments 
suggest that there is a strong likelihood of a return to the more conflictual mode of the 
1980s and early 1990s. 
 
More precise empirical research can map which organisations are motivated to engage in 
European funding bids. The case of Wales was selected as it provided sufficient 
similarites with the rest of the UK in the pre-1999 period, but substantial institutional 
divergence thereafter.  Traditionally EU funds, in Wales as elsewhere, were the preserve 
of local authorities, which have by far the best expertise in the field. Local authorities 
dominated the early structural fund programmes (1989-1991, 1991-93) and remain as key 
players today with the best knowledge and expertise. From 1996 onwards, the 
reorganisation of local authorities, with the creation of the 22 unitary authorities in 
Wales, made local government into an even more effective player. The picture of local 
authority domination needs to be modified. They were challenged in the pre-devolution 
period (1994-99) by non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs) such as the Training and 
Entreprise Councils. Since 2000, moreover, the voluntary sector has massively invested 
resources in attracting EU funds and by 2003; the voluntary sector had become the largest 
player. On the other hand, in Wales as in the broader UK, it has proved difficult to 
involve the private sector.  The UK government has resisted private sector involvement 
because it can not be certain of clawing back grants that fail. The evidence presented 
above from the English regions suggested some improvement in meso-level political 
capacity and the development of rather denser policy networks encompassing local 
authorities, NDPB regional state and private/voluntary actors. But the gradual shift in 
England is much less marked than in the devolved governments (Sandford, 2006, Jeffery 
and Palmer, 2007). 
 
In the French case, there is a much stronger argument that, over time,  EU regional policy 
has led to substantial policy change. From 1988 until the end of the 1990s, in nearly all 
the French regions, adapting traditional methods of encouraging spatial developments to 
fit the EU’s rules led to a number of significant changes (Smith, 1995, Pasquier 2009). In 
particular, the pluri-annual planning of development objectives and funding mechanisms 
frequently led to more detailed negotiations between the different public authorities and 
social actors (associations, chambers of commerce) involved. A significant proportion of 
regional budgets are now committed to multi-year development programs in which the 
Regional Councils, local authorities, the French national state, and the European Union 
all participate. Indeed, the regional planning contracts (‘contrats de plan Etat-Régions  or 
contrats de projet Etats-région [2007-2013]’ – CPER) and the EU’s regional policy have 
become the most important policy tools for territorial development in France today. 
Through the planning contracts, the French national state and the regions establish 
common objectives for development priorities and public investment in each region on a 
multi-year basis. The EU’s regional policy, as implemented through the various structural 
funds, follows a logic similar to that of the CPER. In France, the two policy exercises are 
now closely coordinated; and at this broad level there is goodness of fit.  
 
First introduced in mid to late 1988, at a time when decentralisation began to take effect, 
the reformed structural funds provided regional and local actors with additional, finance 
but also a set of new policy norms such as partnership, programming, concentration, 
subsidiarity development project and/or evaluation (Smyrl 1997, Pasquier 2005). In 
interpreting and using these norms, new relationships between local actors, the state 
administration and representatives of the Commission had to be forged in each region. 
Pushed strongly by the Commission, the obligation to evaluate these programs ex ante, at 
mid-point and ex-post also led to more systematized forms of governing regional 
development.   
 
If interactions remain mainly in the domain of multi-level government, the application of 
the subsidiarity principle has given rise to very different hierarchical configurations in 
France. In this complex game of mutual interdependence, the challenge is to combine two 
central, but often contradictory principles: the free exercise of delegated power by 
sub-national authorities, and the re-affirmation of the state’s coordinating and leadership 
role. For the 2000-06 and 2007-13 contracts, 50% of the state’s contribution was tied up 
in ‘non-negotiable’ projects – a way for central authorities to impose their priorities on 
the regions. If they are to make a difference in this process, the regions must be able to 
bring together the various public and private partners within the region’s territory around 
a shared vision of the regional interest. To face these changes, the strategies of French 
regional elites have diverged widely. In some, such as Brittany, relatively harmonious 
partnerships between state prefectures, regional councils and department-level authorities 
were concocted. However in many others, such as Rhônes-Alpes, Languedoc-Roussillon 
or PACA, implementing the structural funds has produced a battleground for regional-
national and regional-local relations (Duran, 1998 Pasquier, 2004 Smyrl, 1997). 
 
If the European Union has impacted on the development of multilevel politics, it is 
difficult to identify European integration as the main causal driver of enhanced 
decentralization (Pasquier 2009). The above examples demonstrate that the management 
of structural funds mainly reaffirms pre-existing national patterns of centre-periphery 
relations. More, decentralisation is not a settled state of affairs and the temptation to 
invent new forms of central steering is ever present (Cole, 2006).  There remain powerful 
sources of resistance from within the central state machinery to allowing the regions to 
become the principal interlocutors of the Commission. 
 
Territorial variations in ‘unified’ member-states  
 
Patterns of territorial accommodation are likely to vary across member-states, and, quite 
possibly, across time within a particular member-state. One would not expect the same 
dynamics to take place in Germany, with a federal system emphasising Länder rights, but 
also policy uniformity, in Spain or in Belgium. Our selection of the UK and France was 
specifically designed to allow for cross-national comparison, but also to capture variation 
across time in both States.   
 
The evidence presented in the UK and France suggests a pattern of regional variation, 
rather than any neat conclusion in terms of centralisation or decentralization. But the 
internal assymetry is far more developed in the British than the French case. Evidence 
from England suggests some variation in the instrumental and ideational use of Europe as 
a coherent frame for regional elites. On the other hand, neither the (former) Regional 
Development Agencies, nor the broad-based public private urban regimes that developed 
in a number of English cities are a substitute for the powerful governments in Cardiff, 
Edinburgh and, increasingly, Belfast. The real divergence in territorial capacity in 
relation to European integration is a by-product of the devolutionary settlements of the 
late 1990s, which integrate territorial and institutional variation into the operation of the 
State.  In recent years a range of studies have focused on the degree of policy 
convergence and divergence within the UK facilitated by the introduction of an 
asymmetrical form of devolution (Keating, 2002; Greer, 2004; Mackinnon, Shaw and 
Docherty, 2008). This literature has identified a wide range of factors that facilitate or 
constrain divergence and convergence including the political character and capacity of 
devolved administrations, the relative strength of territorially focused interest groups, the 
nature of party systems and public opinion across the constituent parts of the UK and the 
nature of intergovernmental relations. The case of the post-Devolution United Kingdom 
provides an excellent case study of variation across time within the context of a single 
member-state.  
 
Before devolution (1998-99), Whitehall ensured alone the co-ordination of the UK 
position to the EU. Post-devolution, the system has been opened up. The new devolved 
governments have been brought into the process. There have emerged new procedures of 
co-ordination and cohesion between the central UK government and the devolved 
governments. On occasions, such as the UK’s contribution to the Convention on the 
Future of Europe, or in relation to regional languages, the devolved governments acting 
together have managed to steer the broader UK agenda.  Devolution can also heighten 
tensions between different regions within the UK, however, as well as between central 
government and devolved authorities, as in the case of the Scottish Government and the 
UK government since 2007. Academic and practitioner accounts diverge somewhat in 
relation to how to interpret this case of asymmetry; one detailed study of Scottish-EU 
relations, for example,  finds evidence of more continuity than conflict since the 2007 
elections (Carter and Smith 2009), while another emphasizes diverging interests (Parry, 
2008). What is less subject to debate is that, since the arrival of the Scottish National 
Party in power in Scotland in 2007, the informal mode of developing the UK’s EU policy 
has been under severe strain.  
 
In spite of their near-identical formal resources, French regions vary considerably in their 
practical approaches towards lobbying the European Commission or engaging in 
paradiplomacy.  Over a span of centuries, but most particularly of decades, the strategies 
of regional and local elites have resulted in each region in a distinct regional model of 
collective action. In Brittany, the stabilization of relations among political, economic and 
cultural elites within a long-term regional coalition has forced the central state, and now 
the European Commission, to support a territorially defined regional development 
project.  Indeed, political capacity is, at least in part, a process of mediation in which 
elites and social groups produce a vision of the world that allows them at once to 
structure relations among themselves and to define the very ‘interests’ that they are 
pursuing collectively. The European dimension clearly appears as a new structure of 
political opportunities for French regions; it gives them new norms and resources for 
action, though whether they avail themselves of these opportunities is another matter.  
 
One must understand the EU capacity of French regional actors as a sociopolitical 
process rooted in an on-going social construction of territories and centre-periphery 
relationships. It is rooted, too, in identities, understood as a set of socially constructed 
practices, beliefs and visions of the world which shape and guide the strategies of 
regional actors. Therefore, the EU capacity of regional actors results from a complex 
interaction between inherited practices and beliefs and new dynamics of political change 
and encompasses both formal and informal institutional processes (Pasquier 2003, 2004).  
We have uncovered evidence of close co-operation between the State and regional 
council in Brittany, but we could also have emphasised the much less harmonious 
relationships in regions such as Languedoc-Roussillon or PACA.  
 
These examples from France and the UK suggest above all, however,  that localities and 
regions in France and the UK vary in terms of their mobilization in terms of EU structural 
funds and, more generally, in their willingness or capacity to use Europe as a mobilising 
discourse. 
 
Has paradiplomacy empowered sub-national players?   
 
Our final line of enquiry investigates new forms of paradiplomacy, presented  in the 
MLG literature as a key dimension of regional empowerment.  The European Union has 
also encouraged and facilitated the paradiplomacy strategies of local and regional 
authorities in Britain, France and elsewhere (Hooghe, 1996). One of the main analytical 
problems raised by paradiplomacy is that its combination of formal and informal 
elements makes it difficult to grasp (Aldeoca and Keating, 1999). Three main activities 
can be distinguished in the paradiplomacy of the regions at the European level: 
influencing EU decision making; liaising with regional counterparts in the same or other 
countries, as well as national and EU institutions; and networking and information 
gathering.  All the representation offices of French regions tend to do the two last 
activities. However some of them also try to develop real European strategies of 
projection and influence. The European strategies of the French regions depend on 
several factors: the framework of exchange among political, economic, and cultural 
elites; the relationships of cooperation or competition of regional-level political 
institutions with both national and local institutions and with relevant interest groups; and 
the strategy selected by regional leaders concerning relations with European integration 
and institutions.  
 
Turning to one precise case, elites in the historic French region of Brittany were quick to 
recognize the opportunities implicit in European integration. Breton leaders were among 
the earliest to understand the stakes involved. As far back as the 1960s, as the Common 
Market was gradually becoming an economic reality, the political elites of Brittany have 
been very sensitive to European issues. In 1973, the CELIB was one of the founding 
forces of Europe’s first cross-border inter-regional partnership, the Conference of 
Peripheral and Maritime Regions (CPMR), which is today the largest territorial lobby in 
the EU. Within its own administrative services, the Brittany regional council quickly put 
in place a unit charged with European affairs. Together with the neighboring regions of 
Pays de Loire and Poitou-Charentes, Brittany has maintained a permanent representative 
in Brussels since 1988. The new president of the regional council, Jean-Yves Le Drian, 
created in 2005 a new ‘European conference’, which brings to together the four 
‘départements’ and the mains cities of Brittany to define common positions around 
European issues, an initiative followed in 2006 by the launch of a ‘Breton Embassy’ in 
Brussels. This European strategy, added to the political influence of Breton leaders, 
permitted the financing of the high speed rail route (LGV) between Le Mans and Rennes 
in the 2007-13 State-Region project : “We were not convinced by financing the LGV line 
between Rennes and Le Mans. But well, it was a political agreement between the Breton 
authorities and French authorities on one hand and the Breton authorities and the 
political level of the European Commission on the other. So, we accepted it” (Interview, 
DG regio, Brussels, 2009). The Breton leaders, around the President Le Drian, convinced 
the Prime minister, François Fillon, and the French government to sustain their project in 
the face of opposition from the European administration which first refused to finance 
rail infrastructures in ‘regional competitiveness’ regions (Interviews 2008, Conseil 
régional de Bretagne, Rennes, DG regio, Brussels, SGAE Paris
 
). The European 
administration (DG Regio) was forced to back down once a political agreement had been 
reached between the Brittany Regional Council, the French government and the EU 
Commissioner in charge of cohesion policy (Danita Hübner).  
  In the UK, English cities and regions have been involved in the range of EU-related 
activities that are common to partners elsewhere:  setting up offices, involvement in 
lobbying and inter-regional and inter-urban cooperation. Building on the above section, 
there has also been a marked asymmetry between Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, 
on the one hand, and the English localities and regions on the other. Whereas the English 
offices lobby for their localities and regions, the Welsh and Scottish offices are better 
understood as distinct agencies of the UK government operating in Brussels.  The 
devolution settlements in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland retain a large oversight 
for the central government both in developing EU policy and in implementing EU law. 
The UK government (which usually, but not always signifies central government 
ministers) negotiates in the Council of Ministers and the European Council – including in 
those areas that are devolved to the regional institutions. The UK can insist on adopting 
secondary legislation at Westminster to implement EU directives.  On the other hand, the 
Welsh and Scottish Governments exercise a direct influence in Brussels that is out of all 
proportion to their size, both directly, and through the indirect influence they bring to 
bear on the UK government.  
 
For the devolved administrations have been able to combine their status as semi-
sovereign proto-states with privileged access to core elites at the centre of the UK state. 
According to the 1998 concordat on the European Union, civil servants working for the 
devolved governmental offices have diplomatic status. Scottish, Welsh and northern Irish 
government officials have access to all official documentation circulated around the 
member-states, putting them in a privileged position in relation to the offices of sub-
national governments of all other member states (with the possible exception of 
Belgium). The European arena provides a new structure of opportunities for ambitious 
devolved governments, whose offices are more akin to diplomatic missions than they are 
to standard regional offices in Brussels.  The Scottish and Welsh Governments especially 
have attempted to exercise strategic leadership over the representation of Scotland and 
Wales in Europe and distanced themselves from local  government  offices, or mixed 
institutions such as the Committee of the Regions ( Cole and Palmer, 2011, Moore, 2006; 
Interviews, Welsh Assembly Government office in Brussels, 2004, 2008).  Though this 
process of paradiplomacy is partly symbolic, it has produced specific outcomes, such as 
the success of Wales in achieving the recognition of Welsh as a co-official language of 
the EU in 2008, using the diplomatic alliance with Catalonia to push its case.  
 
Scottish and Welsh officials are present in Brussels in all areas where there are significant 
devolved powers. Since the arrival of the Scottish National Party (SNP) in power in 
Scotland in 2007, the informal mode of operation has been under strain. The core 
principles in the relationship between the UK and the devolved governments were 
identified by Carter and Scott (2003) as no surprises, the devolved authorities as 
stakeholders and the need for joined-up governance.  Each of these has been challenged 
since 2007. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the conclusion of one detailed study of cohesion policy from 2000-2006, no single 
country (not even Germany) emerged from the 2000-2006 round with a perfect goodness 
of fit between its domestic priorities and targeted EU regional policy objectives 
(Wishlade, Yuill and Méndez (2003).  In their different ways, France and UK were both 
caught between the tensions of pressures to conform to a European norm and the 
persistence of precise institutional configurations and domestic preferences. In neither 
case, however, did the domestic level simply conform to an EU norm.  
 
In our discussion of EU Regional policy in France and the UK, the strongest hypothesis 
of policy transformation as a result of Europeanisation appears excessive in our two 
cases. The English case provides strong evidence that, though national administrative and 
institutional structures are affected by EU regional policy, the EU dimension is not the 
core consideration of any institutional design. The most recent developments in  England 
suggest that the coalition government did not take the EU dimension into account when 
abolishing the RDAs and creating the new LEPs. Older trends – whereby a Conservative 
government resists interference from Brussels and is quite prepared to lose budgets as a 
result – have shown their persistence. In the case of France, the balance of power 
between levels and the main institutional architecture of French decentralisation have not 
been transformed by EU cohesion policy, insofar as they are built upon existing 
institutions. But we can observe a form of policy recalibration, whereby Europeanisation 
strengthens regional capacity building by providing additional resources for regional 
actors. Consistent with the mobilisation hypothesis, the European dimension clearly 
appears as a new structure of political opportunities for French regions; it gives them new 
norms and resources for action.  
 
Overall, the evidence does not clearly support any of the hypotheses clearly over the 
others. The cases considered offer some evidence of inertia (the management of 
structural funds reaffirming pre-existing national patterns of centre-periphery relations), 
some evidence of policy recalibration (in the UK devolved nations and the French 
regions), but none of policy transformation as a result of EU cohesion policy. As a more 
general point, structural funds policy is perhaps not the most appropriate instrument to 
measure policy change; from this survey, structural funds are an epiphenomenon of 
deeper  explanatory variables rooted mainly (but not exclusively) in domestic 
institutional orders and change. These examples from France and the UK both suggest 
that, if national patterns of centre-periphery relations are subject to sometimes quite rapid 
change, these domestic drivers logically precede effects that might be attributed to 
Europeanisation.  
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